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ABSTRACT 
It is traditionally accepted that the basis of contractual 
liability is either consensus, that is the actual meeting of the 
minds of the contractants, or the reasonable belief by one 
contractants that there is consensus. 
In this paper the various approaches to contractual liability are 
examined. The conclusion that is reached is that the direct 
application of reliance protecti~n can -effectively serve as the 
basis of 'contractual liability in our law today. 
It is submitted that the elements to found contractual liability 
are representation or conduct, unducement; a reasonable reliance 
upon consensus, and detriment or prejudice. It is forcefully argued 
that although blameworthiness (fault) may play a substantial role 
in determining whether reliance upon consensus should be protected, 
it is not the decisive element to the enquiry: rather regard should 
be had to all the surrounding circumstances relating to the 
contractual relationship. 
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RELIANCE PROTECTION AS THE BASIS OF CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper attempts to establish when reliance protection may serve as the basis of 
contractual liability. It has traditionally been contended that the basis of a contract is 'either 
consensus, that is an actual meeting of the minds of the contracting parties, or the 
reasonable belief by one of the contractants that there is consensus' 1• This statement of law 
reflects the two approaches to contractual liability, the one subjective and the other 
objective. 2 
In this paper I shall, however, attempt to indicate when and how reliance upon the existence 
of actual or imputed consensus should be protected and when not. 
THE WILL THEORY AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH 
De Wet and Van Wylr! categorically state that consensus is the basis of a contract4 • 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Van der Merwe, Van Huyssteen, Reinecke, Lubbe and Lotz, Contract, 
General Principles, 1993ed, at 11; Lubbe and Murray, Farlam and 
Hathaway, Contract, 3ed, 1988 at 96. 
Floyd and Pretorius, A Reconciliation of the different approaches to 
Contractual Liability in the absence of Consensus, 1992 THRHR 668. 
at 9. (hereinafter frequently referred to as De Wet since he is solely 
responsible for this Volume of the work) . De Wet seems to have been 
greatly influenced by the writers of the Netherlands who also approach 
their treatment of the law of Contract in the same manner as he does. 
Compare Hartkamp, Asser's Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het 
Nederlands Burgelijk Recht, Deel II, Algemene Leer Der Overeenkomsten, 
Sed, 1989, par. 97 likewise holds that the consensual theory is the 
basis of a contract and that in exceptional cases the reliance theory 
may be applied. In the locus classicus in English law, Raffles v 
Wichelhaus and Another (1864) 2 H & C 906, the court accepted the 
argument of Counsel for the defendants that no binding contract came 
into existence since there was · no consensus ad idem between the 
parties. In like vein is the proposition in American Law Institute, 
Restatement of the Law, Contracts, at par. 71 (c) . Also see Lubbe and 
Murray, supra, at 106. 
See D.2.1.15; D.2.14.1.3; D.39.20; D.50.16.219; D.17.116.2; See van der ~ 
Merwe et alii, supra, at 13. Vander Merwe, Die Duiwel, Die Hof en Die 
Wil van die Kontraktant, in Gauntlett JJ (ed) ., J.C. NOSTER, 1979, at 
25; Also see Saambou-Nasionale Bouvereniging v Friedman 1979 (3) 978 
. ! 
9 
- 2 -
'Kontraktuele aanspraaklikheid berus logies en histories op consensus en consensus sien 
op die "wil" van die kontrakterende partye. Die aangewese uitgangspunt is dus die "wil". 
Die hele kontraktereg rus op die "wil" as bron van aanspreeklikheid'. 5 This approach is 
termed the subjective approach, whilst the theory which underlies it is called the consensual 
or the will theory ('wilsteorie'). 6 This approach may also be termed as the psychological 
approach to contracts'. According to this theory a contract comes into being if the parties 
are ad idem (of one accord or have a concursus animorum) in respect of the obligation 
(i.e. a vinculum iuris) they intend creating between them. 8 A premise for contractual 
liability that underlies consensus and enhances the doctrine of the sanctity of contracts is, 
'belofte maakt skuld' .9 
De Wet10 indicates that this basis is not uncritically accepted by everyone. This is 
5 
6 
7 
8 
(A) at 993F; Malan, Horty Investments v Interior Acoustics (Pty) Ltd 
1984 3 SA 537 (W), 1985 THRHR 227; Van Rensburg, Die Grondslag van 
Kontraktuele Gebondenheid, 1986 THRHR 448; Atiyah, Essays on Contract, 
Clarendon Press-Oxford, 1986, at 13, refers to this approach as the 
'classical model'; Van der Merwe and Van Huyssteen, Kontraksluiting en 
Toerekenbare Skyn, 1993 TSAR 493. Van der Merwe and Van Huyssteen, 
Reasonable Reliance on Consensus, Iustus Error and the creation of 
Contractual Obligations, 1994 SALJ 679. 
Estoppel by Representation, at 72 note 3. 
Kerr and a host of other academics likewise have consensus as the 
premise for contractual liability. Van Dunne, supra, at 8. Also seeR. 
H. Christie, The Law of Contract in South Africa, 2ed, 1991, at 1; A.S. 
Burrows, The Will Theory of Contract Revived - Fried's 'Contract as 
Promise', 1985 Current Legal Problems 141, asserts that in terms of 
this theory a contract is 'based on a promise and a promise as being 
a volunt~ry acceptance of an obligation' . 
See Vander Merwe, Die Duiwel, supra, at 15. 
Van der Merwe et alii, supra, at 13. Also see Van Der Merwe, Die 
Duiwel, supra, at 16; Kerr, supra, at 3. Van Rensburg, supra, at 448. 
Van Dunne, supra, at 8; Kritzinger, Approach to Contract A 
Reconciliation, 1983 SALJ 47 at 54; L.C. Hofmann, The Basis of the 
Effect of Mistake on Contractual Obligations, 1935 SALJ 432; Kahn, Some 
Mysteries of Offer and Acceptance, 1955 SALJ 246. 
Dunne, supra, at 15; Hartkamp, supra, paras. 37- 38; Atiyah, supra, at 10, 15; A. De Moor, Are 
Contracts Promises?, Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence Third Series (Eekelaar and Bell eds) 1987 103; C. 
Fried, Contract as Promise: A theory of Contractual Obligation, Harvard University Press, 1981, at 1, 
16. Fried is of the view that the obligation 'to keep a promise is grounded not in arguments of utility, but 
in respect for individual autonomy and in trust'. 
10 supra, at 9 et sequuntur; for the three theories, see Hartkamp, par. 99. 
- 3 -
especially so where dissensus exists between the parties by virtue of an error where the 
real intention of the parties is at variance with their declared or manifested intention. 112 
A mistake or error is a material or operative or essential wrong impression or belief 
with regard to some material fact relating to the contract. 12 The will of the contractants 
can thus b~ vitiated or nullified by dissensus13• 
\~ 
Consequently other theories such as the declaration theory and the reliance theory have also 
been propounded as bases for contractual liability. The consensual theory is no longer 
regarded in many circles as being reflexive of social and commercial interaction. 14 
In terms of the declaration theory contractants are bound to their contract on the basis of 
their 'objective, coinciding declarations of will' 15• In this case the express or declared or 
manifested intentions of the parties take precedence over their actual or real intentions. 
THE OBJECTIVE APPROACH 
It generally agreed that the objective approach is contained in the iustus error test. Fried 
remarks that 'contracts generally are a device for allocating risks ... The court cannot enforce 
the will of the parties because there are no concordant wills. Judgment must therefore be 
11 Meijers, Verzamelde Privaatrechtelijke Opstellen, Verbintenissenrect, Derde Deel, Leiden, 1955, at 81 -82. In the 
United States, by virtue of this very fact, Patrick Atiyah in his The Rise and Fall of the Freedom of Contract 
regards the imposed obligations of compensating for detrimental reliance and unjust enrichment as underlying 
contract. For writers holding views similar to those of Atiyah, the contract disappears as a branch of the law 
worthy of separate demarcation and study. See Burrows, supra, at 142. Harker, The Role of Contract and the 
Object of Remedies of Breach of Contract in Contemporary Western Society, 1984 SAU 121, at 127- 128 the 
learned writer discusses the shortcomings of the will theory. 
12 In general see Joubert (ed), LA WSA, Vol. 5, at 36 et sequuntur. Also see Floyd and Pretorius, supra, at 668. 
According to Murray and Lubbe, a mistake, 'in the broadest sense of the word, entails a 'state of mind that is not 
in accord with the facts', supra, at 132. 
13 Hofmann, supra, at 432. Hence Burrows in analysing the works of different academics, indicates that Fried's view 
is that in the event of a mistake a contractant has 'not voluntarily accepted an obligation to do anything, i.e. in the 
circumstances he has made no promise' (supra, at 145). 
14 See Lubbe and Murray and the authorities cited there, supra, at 107. 
15 Van der Merwe et alii, supra, at 28; De Wet and VanWyk at 12. 
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based on principles external to the will of the parties ... One such device is the reference to 
presumed intent' .16 Under the influence of Anglo-American law, an objective approach17 
is adopted by some writers here and abroad to found contractual liability : It is the 
manifestation of the intention and not the actual intention of the contractants which matters 
most. This does not mean, however, that an objective approach to contractual liability 
necessarily incorporates the declaration theory18• Kahn is not correct in my view in his 
contention that the objective approach is as a matter of cause automatically equivalent to 
the declaration theory. 19 Corbin20 asserts that "the 'objective theory' is based upon a 
great illusion - the illusion that words, either singly or in combination, have a 'meaning' 
that is independent of the persons who use them ... that is to say that parties are bound in 
accordance with the meaning that reasonable third parties would give to their expressions 
without regard to the meaning given by either of the parties themselves. The actual 
decisions do not justify this statement". The objective approach is often referred to as the 
normative approach by the Dutch writers. 21 
In this essay I shall use the words objective and normative interchangeably. Van 
16 supra, at 59 - 60. 
17 The underlying rationale for this approach in the United States is the requirement of fairness that the other 
contractant's expectations should not be disappointed. See Burrows, supra, at 145; Bamford, Mistake and 
Contract, 1955 SAU 166 at 171; Ramsden, Justus Error Reconsidered, 1973 SAU 393 at 400; Atiyah, supra, 
at 13, 21; A. De Moor, Intention in the Law of Contract: Elusive or lllusory? 1990 Law Quarterly Review 632, 
634, 638 ' ... the presumed intention of the parties'. 
18 Cf Van der Merwe et alii; supra, at 29. 
19 Hahlo H.R. and Kahn E, The Union of SA, The Development of its Laws and Constitution, 1960ed, at 441. 
20 On Contracts, par. 106. At par. 104. Corbin asserts that there may be a valid contract even though there is no 
mutual 'meeting of the minds', but for such a result there must be agreement of expression. The language used 
should, however, lead the offeror to reasonably believe that the acceptance is unconditional. Also see Christie, 
supra, at 383 'whatever his subjective state of mind.' Burrows points out that the objective theory of intention is 
according to Fried based on a non-promissory principle and hence this theory does not explain a great deal 'of 
contractual enforcement' (supra, at 147). 
21 J.M. van Dunne, Normatiewe uitleg van rechthandelingen, Kluwer- Deventer, 1972, at 1, 3 et sequuntur. 
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Rensburg22 talks of 'oenskynlike wilsuiting' which is obviously a term used to embrace 
the objective approach. 
Furmston and Simpson23 indicate that English law adopts an 'objective test of agreement'. 
In 1478 Chief Justice Brian proclaimed that the 'intent of a man cannot be tried, for the 
Devil himself knows not the intent of a man. '24 Hence Lord Eldon has indicated that it is 
not the task of an English-law judge 'to see that both parties really meant the same thing, 
but only that both gave their assent to that proposition which, be it what it may, de facto 
arises out of the terms of their correspondence' .25 If a reasonable man would find that the 
parties 'gave their assent' to the terms of the contract, then one party's reliance upon that 
fact (finding) should be protected. 
To reconcile the psychological with the objective approach, Harker26 contends that the 
internal will of the parties is regarded as significant in so far as it co-incides with the 
objective meaning that a reasonable man would attribute to the parties' expression of 
intention. 
RELIANCE PROTECTION 
An alternative basis of contractual liability is what I shall term 'reliance protection' ('the 
reliance theory', 'vertrouensteorie' or the theory of belief'). According to this theory the 
22 supra, at 449. It is submitted that this is the starting point of the iustus error test. Lubbe and Murray, supra, at 
106, who maintainthat the most important variants of the objective postulate are the declaration and reliance 
theories. They furthermore contend, quite correctly, that our law does not subscribe to the consensual theory of 
contract without qualification, and that in cases of dissensus a corrective liability embedded upon an objective basis 
is applied. See supra, at 163. 
23 Cheshire. Fifoot and Furmston's Law of Contract, lled, 1986, at 28. 
24 Anon (1477) YB Edw. 4, fo. 1, pl 2. 
25 Kennedy v Lee (1817) 3 Mer 441. 
26 supra, at 135. 
27 DeVos, supra, at 179; Van Dunne, supra, at 4; Meijers, supra, at 82 et sequuntur; Hartkamp, supra, at par. 
302. 
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belief which one contractant has created in the mind of the other regarding his intention 
forms the basis of the contract28• This theory 'postulates that enforceability depends on the 
reasonable expectations conveyed to the mind of each party by the words or conduct of the 
other. ' 29 
THE DIRECT APPLICATION OF RELIANCE PROTECTION 
By the direct application of this theory the reasonable impression or reliance held by one 
contractant that the other party had the same intention is contractually protected. 30 It is 
immediately clear why the reliance protection theory has traditionally been regarded as only 
supplementary to the will theory. The rationale for this contention is that if two parties have 
coinciding intentions there is consensus and no need to inquire whether one of the parties 
had any particular impression of the other's intention. ' 31 
Reinecke indicates that the requirements for direct application of reliance protection are 
stated positively. 32 He thus contends that once the requirements are satisfied, a valid 
contract comes into being. 33 
28 Vander Merwe, Die Duiwel, supra, at 31; Kritzinger, Approach to Contract: A Reconciliation, 1983 SALJ 47, 
at 49; An Anglo-American Law writer proposes the following basis for contractual liability : 'that expectations 
engendered by a binding promise should be fulfilled', Burrows, supra, at 149. This proposition is in my \ 1 
submission but another formulation reliance protection. Burrows thus refers to his theory as his 'expectation theory 
of promising'. He asserts that this theory will encourage contractants to rely on the other's promises (my 
emphasis). He asserts that this theory encourages mutual co-operation and trust which is to the benefit to the entire 
society. 
29 Christie, supra, at 1. Vander Merwe and Van Huyssteen, 1994 SAU, at 686. 
30 Reinecke, Regstreekse of onregstreekse toepassing van die vertrouensteorie?, 1989 TSAR 509. 
31 Van der Merwe, et alii, supra, at 29. 
32 1989 TSAR 509. 
33 supra at 509, 513. He designates this contract as a 'vertrouenskontrak'. This is a term that he has borrowed from 
Malan, 1985 THRHR 227, at 231. Also see De Wet, Dwaling by Kontraksluiting, at 4; De Moor, supra, at 635. 
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According to Reinecke34 the requirements for the direct application of reliance protection 
are: 
(a) The contract-denier should have created the impression in the mind of the 
contract-assertor that the former intended to be bound by the apparent 
contract (i.e. there must be a some form of conduct or representation of the 
will or at times referred to as a misrepresentation); 
(b) The contract-denier should have induced the reliance on consensus with the 
contract-assertor, or in other words, the contract-denier should have acted 
upon that representation ('moet regtens aan die kontrakontkenner 
toerekenbaar wees'); 
(c) The contract-assertor's reliance must be reasonable, i.e. that a reasonable 
man would have drawn the same inferences from the conduct of the contract-
denier. 
Other writers require additional requirements such as fault on the part of the contract-
denier, and that the contract-assertor should actually have suffered prejudice. On these two 
requirements the writers are divided. According to De Wee5 , in the absence of damage 
or prejudice, 'bestaan daar geen rede waarom die ander persoon gebonde sal wees aan 'n 
kontrak wat hy nie gewil het nie'. The writer adds that if there is no fault on the part of 
the contract-denier, then 'het hy sy waan aan sy eie skuld te wyte36 • Hierdie laaste vereiste 
verklaar waarom die vertroue 'n redelike vertroue37 moet wees. 
'Dat dit 'n billike oplossing is, kan niemand betwyfel nie. Dit is nie aileen billik nie 
maar ook juri dies te regverdig deur skuld as die grondslag van aanspreeklikheid aan 
34 1994 TSAR 372, at 376. 
35 Dwaling en Bedrog by die Kontraksluiting, at 4 - 5. Also see Floyd and Pretorius at 671; Kahn, 
Contract and Mercantile Law, 2ed, Vol. 1 at 300. 
36 Christie, supra, agrees that the fault principle applies to both parties (at 383 note 4). Christie seems totally 
confused. On the one hand he refers to the fault principle as the 'fifth wheel to the coach' and now he admits that 
the element of fault may be of importance to avoid contractual liability. Also see Meijers, supra, at 91. 
37 Van Dunne, supra, at 4. 
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te wys. ' 38 
It is my contention that apart from the elements mentioned by Reinecke as adumbrated 
above, prejudice/detriment or damage/loss must also be present to found contractual 
liability. As far as this element is concerned, I would support the attenuated meaning 
ascribed to it in Peri-Urban Areas Health Board v Breet NO & Anothe~9 per Trollip AJ 
(as he then was): 'the very act of the one contracting party in entering into contract in 
reliance of the other's conduct will be regarded in most bilateral contracts as a sufficient 
alteration of his position to his detriment to meet the requirement of prejudice'. I agree with 
De Vos that by virtue of the demands of commercial certainty, this wide connotation given 
to prejudice is tenable. After all, in most cases, when this requirement, as set out here is 
satisfied, the contractant would have suffered a loss or harm, or in the very least, the 
likelihood thereof. There is no need, in my view, to prove the extent or to quantify the loss 
suffered or likely to have been suffered in the present context. The mere fact that it existed, 
factually or potentially, is sufficient. Turpin40 and Christie are of the view that prejudice 
or detriment of any sort need not be proved in the present context. I disagree. Proof of 
prejudice or detriment in the way that I have indicated above should be a requirement, and 
such proof does not pay lip-service to this requirement, with respect. 
Finally then, it would appear that in the absence of an allegation of prima facie actual 
consensus, the contract-assertor would have to rely upon direct reliance protection to hold 
the contract-denier liable to the contract. 
THE INDIRECT APPLICATION OF RELIANCE PROTECTION AND 
IUSTUS ERROR 
The iustus error approach to the problem of mistake is regarded as being the indirect 
38 Dwaling en Bedrog by die Kontraksluiting, at 4 - 5. Malan, supra, fully supports these requirements of De Wet, 
at 228. As at 1979 VanDer Merwe indicated that the courts had by then not paid much attention to the content 
of the reasonableness criterion in respect of the reasonable belief which is required to exist. 
39 1958 (3) SA 783 (1) at 790. 
40 1958 Annual Survey of South African Law. 46 at 47- 49; Christie, supra, at 27. 
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application of reliance protection41 : it is a particular way in which reliance protection is 
applied when there appears to be an ostensible contract. There must be a material mistake 
which constitutes the intention theory and the mistake must be reasonable which in turn is 
tested by the indirect application of the reliance theory. 
According to Reinecke the iustus error doctrine was the most popular approach used by 
our courts in the context of dissensus per errorem until 198~2 • A person who relies on 
a iustus error alleges that he was labouring under a mistake which is operative, material 
and reasonable (iustus). The issue of mistake is thus viewed and approached from the 
perspective of the party relying on his error. If a party relies on a iustus error, he alleges 
that a contract is a nullity or void - of no force or effect. A mistake is reasonable if one 
contractant was induced by a representation caused by the other party or if the other party 
knew that the contract-denier laboured under a misapprehension. This will be the case if 
the misapprehension or error is based on the false reliance created on the mind of the 
contract-denier by the other party. The contract-denier can then rely on the nullity of the 
contract on the basis of a iustus error. An error would be iustus when the party who is 
under a misapprehension is not to blame for it. 43 
One view is that by employing the iustus error approach the courts appear to assume that 
the declaration theory provides the basis for contractual liabili~. The better view is : 
'It must be stressed that the reliance theory as expressed in the iustus error approach is 
at most merely an additional basis of contract, applied only in exceptional circumstances. 
It has not been substituted for the intention theory'45 , i.e. the intention theory is tempered 
by the reliance theory in this context. 'Die vertrouensteorie bied 'n aanneemlike 
41 Lubbe and Murray, supra, at 168; Reinecke, 1989 TSAR 509; 1994 TSAR 376. 
42 1989 TSAR 509. 
43 DeVos, supra, at 181. This does not mean, however, that the contract-assertor has to prove fault on the part of 
the contract-denier to succeed in holding the latter to the contract on the basis of reliance protection. 
44 Reinecke, supra, at 510. 
45 Joubert (ed), supra, at 58 par 127. 
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verklaring vir die iustus error-benadering. '46 In this regard one would thus speak of the 
indirect application of reliance protection.47 Thus as Van der Merwe and Van 
Huyssteen48 indicate that there are Appellate Division decisions in which the reliance 
protection was employed instead of following the so-called iustus error approach. The 
ratio for this is nothing other than the fact that the former theory encapsulates the latter 
approach as well, in the sense that it can be equally effectively applied in the same manner 
as when the latter approach is resorted to. When the reliance protection theory is applied 
in this context, then reliance upon the justifiable, material and reasonable error made by 
the contract-denier will nullify the contract. It is against this background that 
Reinecke poses the question : 'Indien die iustus error benadering inderdaad neerkom op 
'n onregstrekse toepassing van die vertrouensteorie en dus op 'n bevredigende grondslag 
berus, ontstaan die vraag nietemin of vertrouensbeskerming daarmee net so goed of beter 
as met 'n regstreekse toepassing van die vertrouensteorie gedien kan word'49 • Reinecke 
positively asserts the iustus error approach has reliance protection as its objective. 50 
Lubbe and Murray51 consider the choice between the 'protection of an induced reliance 
directly as illustrated in the Smith v Hughes doctrine, or indirectly by means of the justus 
error' as a complex one. They support Van Rensburg, an exponent of the iustus error 
approach, since they contend that this doctrine'affords a more nuanced approach to the 
problem'. On this issue, before questioning whether to assimilate the two versions of the 
reliance theory in our case law to a single doctrine, I would like to add that 'the justus 
error doctrine, properly understood, should not be discarded lightly, a conclusion which 
is supported by its resurgence in the case law'52 • 
46 Van Rensburg, supra, at 459. 
47 Vander Merwe, Die Duiwel, supra, at 31, Van Rensburg, supra, at 453. Also see Vander Merwe and Van 
Huyssteen et alii, supra, at 40. 
48 1994 SAU 679, at 680. 
49 1989 TSAR 509. 
50 supra, at 509, 510. 
51 supra, at 180. 
52 Van Rensburg, supra, at 181. 
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Reinecke is correct in asserting that a contract cannot arise from a iustus error. 53 
Reinecke asserts that in most cases where the iustus error approach is adopted it ultimately 
leads to the same results as the direct application of the reliance theory since both have as 
common denominator the protection of reasonable reliance, but questions whether the two 
approaches will always lead to the same results. One reason that he raises for asserting the 
negative, is the fact that the iustus error approach does not provide a basis of contractual 
liability, but merely a recipe for evading contractual liability54 - this thus appears to be its 
main shortcoming. It serves as a mechanism to establish whether a person can escape 
liability from an apparent contract. 55 Although it is conceded that the iustus error 
doctrine brings about a shift in the onus probandi since it places the burden of proof on 
the party who has personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances which led to the 
dissensus, i.e. the contract-denier, Reinecke rejects the argument that the doctrine is more 
suitable from an evidentiary point of view for there is nothing that prevents one from 
altering the onus probandi without sacrificing the direct approach. Further he contends that 
the proposition that the iustus error approach is more nuanced holds no water, since the 
requirements for liability on the basis of the reliance protection can be formulated in a 
positive form so as to eradicate the need to resort to the iustus error approach56 • He thus 
concludes that the direct application of reliance protection (with or without a change in the 
onus probandi) is the more convincing and simple approach towards the question of 
contractual liability in the absence of actual consensus. 
Lubbe and Murray contend that the elements of the iustus error approach are reasonable 
reliance, inducement and possibly also fault and prejudice57 • According to Reinecke58, 
53 Idem. 
54 supra, at 511. 
55 supra, at 512; also see Reinecke, 1989 TSAR 509. The absence of culpability on the part of the contract-
denier, will serve to intensify the reasonableness of the error, although in the stricto sensu, the absence 
of fault need not be proven by the contract-denier. 
56 supra, at 513. 
57 supra, at 168. 
58 1994 TSAR 376- 7. 
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a reasonable mistake can only exist if one of the requirements for the direct protection of 
reasonable reliance as indicated above is absent. Consequently, if a contract-denier asserts 
that his error is reasonable, he must also prove that one or other requirement for reliance 
protection is lacking. 
From our discussion so far it is clear that there is much overlap in the elements of direct 
and indirect reliance protection. The fundamental question of the enquiry still remains 
whether the contract-denier 'op 'n regtens toerekenbare wyse 'n redelike vertroue van 
wilsooreenstemming by die kontrakbeweerder veroorsaak het' 59 • For this very reason it 
is thus not necessary to ascertain whether in this context a misrepresentation was created 
by an omission or if other unlawful conduct existed, since the crucial issue is the protection 
of reliance60 • 
A party will be able to rely on indirect reliance protection where the contract-assertor 
alleges that both parties prima facie expressed consensual declarations to be bound by the 
contract. In such a case the contract-denier would then have to aver that his mistake was 
reasonable and material which will be the case if one of the elements to found direct 
reliance protection is absent, namely that there was no representation which could 
reasonably be relied upon, or no causal connection, or no reasonable reliance, nor was any 
prejudice or loss sustained. 
THE POSITIVE LAW 
Smith v Hughes61 is the case which serves as the fons et origo for the debate in South 
African law. Blackburn 162 enunciated the following: 
'I apprehend that if one of the parties intends to make a contract on one set of terms, and 
59 Reinecke 1994 TSAR 377. 
60 Idem. 
61 (1871) L.R. 6 Q.B. 597; De Moor refers to the Blackburn J - dictum as the origin of the objective principle, 
supra, 641 note 34. 
62 supra, at 607. 
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the other intends to make a contract on another set of terms, or, as it is sometimes 
expressed, if the parties are not ad idem, there is no contract, unless the circumstances are 
such as to preclude one of the parties from denying that he agreed to the terms of the 
other'. 
Blackburn 163 then went on to enunciate the following dictum which forms the cornerstone 
of our debate and I shall hereinafter refer to it as the Blackburn J - dictum : 'If, whatever 
a man's real intentions may be, he so conducts himself that a reasonable man would believe 
that he was assenting to the terms proposed by the other party, and that other party upon 
whom that belief enters into the contract with him, the nian thus conducting himself would 
be equally bound as if he had intended to agree to the other party's terms'. 
'And I agree that even if the vendor was aware that the purchaser thought the article 
possessed that quality, and would not have entered into the contract unless he had so 
thought, still the purchaser is bound, unless the vendor was guilty of some fraud or 
deceit upon him, and that a mere abstinence from disabusing the purchaser of that 
impression is not fraud or deceit; for whatever may be the case in a court of morals, there 
is no legal obligation on the vendor to inform the purchaser that he is under a mistake, 
not induced by the act of the vendor'64 (my emphasis). This was the actual ratio 
decidendi of the court or the ESSENCE thereof. It is quite clear from the above dicta 
that the court will apply reliance protection 'directly' if the contract-denier caused the 
contract-assertor to believe that the former was concluding a contract on the terms 
understood by the latter. Conversely, the court will protect the mistaken belief held by the 
contract-denier, if he created in the mind of the contract-assertor the reasonable reliance 
that they had reached consensus, and the contract-assertor induced by that reliance, acted 
thereupon to his detriment or prejudice. 
The essence of the case is that S did not induce H's misapprehension or there was no 
reasonable reliance to be protected. 
63 
at 607. 
64 
at 607. .:;· 
,. 
·\, 
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As far back as 1924 Wessels JA stated the following65 : 
'The law does not concern itself with the working of the minds of parties to a contract, but 
with the external manifestation of their minds. Even therefore from a philosophical 
standpoint if the minds of the parties do not meet, yet by their acts their minds seem to 
have met, the law will, where fraud is not alleged, look to their acts and assume that their 
minds did meet and that they contracted in accordance with what the parties purport to 
accept as a record of their agreement'. 
De Wet66 asserts that this approach of merely concentrating on the external appearance of 
the parties at the expense of the real intention has already been rejected nearly two millenia 
ago. De Wet indicates that on the facts the issue was one party's reliance upon the content 
of a letter as opposed to the other's reliance on the oral agreement. Kahn is equally critical 
of this dictum and asserts that such a principle which is 'linked to the mind of neither party, 
is clearly untenable'. 67 
A more convincing view is that of Van der Merwe and Reinecke who assert that this dictum 
is entirely reconcilable with the reliance theory. 68 These writers indicate ibi that the real 
intention of the parties can 'immers gewoonlik slegs met verwysings na uiterlike 
manifestasies van die b~doelings bepaal word; die uiterlike wilsverklaringe is per slot van 
sake primere getuienis oor die wil'. 69 Hence it follows that this dictum must not be taken 
literally or at face value. The external manifestation or facts relate to facta probantia to 
prove a factum probandum, i.e. consensus. That this was the intention of Wessels JA is 
65 South African Railways and Harbours v National Bank of South Africa Ltd 1924 AD 704, at 715 - 716. 
66 supra, at 24. 
67 supra, at 442. 
68 1979 TiiRHR 439; Lubbe and Murray share their views at 113. 
69 supra, 439- 440; Van Dunne, who claims that the will of the parties is deduced from the external manifestations 
thereof, supra, at 2; ' ... the courts interpret contracts objectively, simply because this is the ordinary way in which 
we interpret what people say', De Moor, supra, at 644. The main contention of De Moor in this article seems to 
be that contractual obligations need to be intentionally undertaken, i.e. the rehabilitation of intention in the law of 
contract; Vander Merwe and Van Huyssteen, 1993 TSAR 493; Minister of Home Affairs v American Ninja IV 
Partnership 1993 (1) SA 257 (A) at 269D -F. 
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clear from his own writings. 70 
In George v Fairmead (Pty) Ltd71 Fagan CJ enunciated the following locus classicus 
dictum: 
'When can an error be said to be justus for the purpose of entitling a man to repudiate his 
apparent assent to a contractual term? As I read the decisions, our courts, in applying the 
test, have taken into account the fact that there is another party involved and have 
considered the position. They have, in effect, said : Has the first party - one who is trying 
to resile - been to blame in the sense that by his conduct he has led the other party, as a 
reasonable man, to believe that he was binding himself? ... If his mistake is due to a 
misrepresentation, whether innocent or fraudulent, by the other party, then of course, it is 
the second party who is to blame and the first party is not bound'. 
The court held that where a party signs a contract without acquainting himself with the 
contents thereof, he cannot repudiate his assent to such contents on the basis that his error 
was iustus. Under such circumstances his error is unreasonable and hence he is bound by 
the contract. Christie refers to various authorities requiring fault in applying the doctrine 
of 'quasi-mutual assent', but asserts that in the light of this dictum to 'talk of blame now 
the Appellate Division has defined blame in this context as no more·than conduct inducing 
a particular belief is to add a fifth wheel to the coach'. 72 He distinguishes the 
reasonableness or reasonable person test from that of negligence. 
Commenting upon this dictum Fevrier-Breed73 asserts that Fagan CJ explained that he was 
70 Wessels, The Law of Contract in South Africa, 2ed, 1951, par. 62. Also see Christie, supra, at 21 et sequuntur. 
How jurists can claim that to prove subjective intention is nearly an impossibility and then to use this ridiculous 
reason for objecting to the will theory, is dismissed out of hand. Daily in all our criminal courts, offences are 
prosecuted which have intention as an element, and there, provided that the quantum of evidence is sufficient, 
perpetrators of crimes are convicted. See for example, Lubbe and Murray, supra, at 108- 109. This reason which 
is advanced by certain jurists is absolutely unconvincing and indeed silly to say the least. 
71 1958 (2) SA 465 (A), at 471NB - C. 
72 supra, at 26. 
73 The "fault principle" and justus error in mistake in contract, 1996 THRHR, 209 at 213. 
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using the words 'to blame' in the sense that the first party has by his conduct led the other 
party reasonably to believe that he was binding himself to the contract. She furthermore 
contends that 'conduct and words forming part of the alleged declaration of intent are 
interpreted in accordance with the understanding of a reasonable man in the circumstances -
this is not a test for negligence, but a rule of interpretation'. 74 She asserts negligence is 
arguably always unreasonable, whilst an unreasonable act is not always a negligent one. He 
correctly indicates that the well-known test for negligence as enunciated in Kruger v 
Coetzee75 has not found application in cases relating to mistake in contract. 
In Mondorp Eiendomsagentskap (Edms) Bpk v Kemp en De Beer76 Rumpff CJ held77 that 
as the parties were not ad idem, no contract came into being. Jansen JA could, with 
respect, not resist the temptation to once again (i.e. after the Saambou decision) address the 
issue of the basis of contractual liability. In a minority judgment Jansen JA accepted that 
there was dissensus between the parties. Thus on the basis of the consensual theory no 
contract came into being due to the absence of actual consensus78 • The court accepted 
without any fear of contradiction that the consensual theory ('die wilsteorie') is the basis 
of contractual liability in our law.79 The court then relied upon the Blackburn J-dictum to 
test whether an 'objective' contract came into existence based on the reliance theory. The 
court in adjudicating this issue mentioned that it is still undecided in our law whether fault 
and detriment are elements which have to be satisfied for the application of the reliance 
theory. 80 The court held, without deciding these issues, that L had in any event acted 
blameworthily and that D acted upon the belief created by L to the detriment of K and D. 
74 supra, at 213, This view is reiterated at 215- 216. 
75 1966 (2) SA 428 (A) 430. This he mentions at 217. 
76 1979 (4) SA 74 (A). 
77 
at 78A. 
78 at 78E- F. 
79 
at 78G- H. 
80 at 78H. 
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It is imperative to note that in casu Jansen JA held that M was 'kontraktueel 
aanspreeklik' 81 , which means that the learned judge of appeal accepted that reliance 
protection is a source of contractual liability. 
In Horty Investments (Pty) Ltd v Interior (Pty) Ltd82 Coetzee J stated that '(o)nly to a 
limited category of mistakes will the law attach the quality of iustus, and the fault principle 
looms large in the determination of this question'. 83 The mistaken party will therefore not 
be able to rely on the lack of true consensus if his mistake was due to his own fault. The 
other party is then. entitled to rely on the doctrine of quasi-mutual assent ('die skyn van 'n 
kontrak') which renders the contract binding and enforceable despite dissensus. ' 84 The 
other contractant must also be blameless. 'If he is to blame then the first party is not 
bound. ' 85 
Coetzee J furthermore held that the 'fault principle underlies the iustus error doctrine'. 86 
The court held that as both parties were at fault in so far as their belief of the period of the 
lease was concerned, consequently the lease as it read was null and void, and the plaintiff 
should be allowed to amend its particulars of claim. Beck concerns himself with the order 
which was granted: he questions that if no agreement exists between the parties, what then 
was the actual relationship between the parties?87 Beck concludes that only a portion of 
the lease agreement should have been held to be void and not the entire agreement. There 
is possibly merit in this argument: I submit that the period which was common cause 
between the parties should have been considered as the duration of the valid contract. 
Malan indicates that by virtue of the finding of the court, it was unnecessary for it to decide 
81 
at 79D/E. 
82 1984 (1) SA 537 (W). 
83 at 539G. 
84 
at 540. 
85 at 540. Lubbe and Murray, supra, at 165 argue that 'recognition of reliance will, furthermore, make it unnecessary 
to import the notion of fault on the part of the enforcer as an element of the doctrine' as was done in casu. 
86 
at 541. 
87 Mistake and Fault, 1985 SAU 8 at 9. 
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on the issue of prejudice. 88 Sharrock admits that the result of this decision cannot be 
faulted but he correctly questions the need for the fault principle since there is confusion 
as to the precise meaning of 'fault' or blame' in this context. 89 'Carelessness' or 
'inattention' are words indicating negligence90 and should thus be avoided as a factum 
probandum, but such qualities in a person may serve as facta probantia of the 
reasonableness of a party's reliance. Sharrock concludes that in the light of certain 
Appellate Division decisions cited by him, Coetzee J erred in requiring the existence of 
fault since he implicitly did not regard himself bound by these dicta. According to 
Sharrock : 'Hitherto the great weight of authority has been in favour of resolving problems 
of contractual liability without resorting to any principle of culpability to do so'. 91 
Sharrock seems to have been prophesying the inevitable which had to take place, and indeed 
it did in Sonap 's case, dealt with below. Kerr is of the view that the issue which was really 
involved in the instant case is dissensus, i.e. the parties have not reached agreement in 
respect of material provisions of a contract, and hence no contract. 92 
In Spes Bona Bank Ltd v Portals Water Treatment South Africa (Pty) Ltd93 the legal 
questions which fell to be decided were whether S and P have concluded an agreement in 
terms of which A purchased certain equipment from P, and if not, whether P could be 
estopped from denying the existence of such an agreement. 
The first question was answered in the negative. 94 Hence the court was once again invited 
88 supra, at 230. 
89 Fault and Iustus Error, 1985 SAU 1 at 3. De Wet has set out quite clearly what the content of fault should be 
that I fail to see the confusion. What needs to be asked is whether it is necessary requisite to be established not 
because it is a confusing concept but because it does not serve the needs of the commercial world, for example. 
90 Patel v Le Clus (Pty) Ltd 1946 TPD 30 at 34. De Wet would have used the word 'onagsaam' in accordance with 
his subjective or psychological approach to the will. 
91 
supra, at 4. 
92 Mistakes in Communication of which a Reasonable Man would be aware : Contract or no contract? Error in 
negotio? 1985 SAU 5, at 6. 
93 1983 (1) SA 978 (A). 
94 
at 984C - D. 
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to apply the oft-quoted dictum of Blackburn J. The question to be determined was thus 
whether 'irrespective of what Papae's real intention was, (whether) a reasonable man would 
have regarded his conduct in issuing and delivering the respondent's invoice to Smith of 
Transterra for transmission to the appellant, as constituting in the circumstances an offer 
to sell the equipment to the appellant'. 95 Since the question was answered in the negative 
the court held that P could not be estopped by S. Reinecke views this case as the most 
important one as at 1989 which expressly applied the reliance protection theory. 96 
Malan97 remarks that the court did not specifically require the elements of fault and 
prejudice. 
In Sonap Petroleum (SA) Ltd (formerly known as Sonarep (SA) (Pty) Ltd v 
Pappadogianis98 the court held that P could not rely on the mistake of S to snap up the 
bargain by P not acting in good faith. S's failure to speak up and enquire about the apparent 
error resulted in S committing a unilateral error, and hence there was no contract by virtue 
of the dissensus which existed between the parties. 
Harms AJA stated that the mistake relied upon by S was one committed during the 
expression of its intention : 'it mistakenly believed that its declared intention confirmed its 
actual intention' .99 P's declared intention was consistent with his actual intention. The 
dissensus between the parties was thus as a consequence of S's unilateral error. 100 Harms 
AJA accepted that the law concerns itself with the external manifestations, and not the 
workings, of the minds of parties to a contract. 101 The court held that in the case of an 
95 at 984G - H. 
96 supra, at 509. 
97 supra, at 229. 
98 1992 (3) SA 234 (A). 
99 at 238G - H. 
100 at 238H. 
101 
at 2381 - J. 
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alleged dissensus the court must resort to the reliance theory. 102 The court held that in 
a number of cases in the past, the courts adapted the well-known dictum of Blackburn J. 
Harms AJA held that the relevant question to ask is: 'Did the party whose actual intention 
did not conform to the common intention expressed, lead the other party, as a reasonable 
man, to believe that his declared intention represented his actual intention?' 103 
Harms AJA stated that he could not find any authority for the view expressed by Coetzee 
J in Horty Investments that the 'fault principle looms large' in determining whether an 
error is iustus (excusable). 104 Harms AJA gives 'blame', as used by Fagan CJ, the 
meaning of indicating to another, as a reasonable man, by his conduct to believe that his 
apparent intention was his true intention. It does not mean culpable. 105 The court thus 
rejected the need for the element of fault to found contractual liability based on direct 
reliance. 106 Thus conduct in the form of a reasonable representation suffices. There is no 
additional need for the representation to be blameworthy' whether intentional or negligent. 
The court correctly indicated that if one contractant is aware that the other is labouring 
under a misapprehension, then such a party cannot snap up the bargain with this knowledge 
: such conduct would not be bona fide. 107 In such a case there will be a duty to speak. 
In casu the court held that there was no consensus, actual or imputed, hence the addendum 
was void. For Kerr, one of the highlights of the instant decision is that the court declared 
that there are circumstances in which a prospective contracting party has ' a duty to speak 
102 
at 239A. 
103 at 2391- J; See my discussion of the Wessels JA -dictum above. 
104 
at 240C. 
105 
at 240E. 
106 at 240G - I. The reasons for this are: there is little authority for such a requirement, it has induced much academic 
criticism, it is unnecessary. See Floyd and Pretorius, supra, at 670. Lubbe and Murray, Farlam and Hathaway 
: Contract - Cases, materials and commentary, 1988ed, 165 where these writers contend that recognition 'of 
reliance will, furthermore, make it unnecessary to import the notion of fault on the part of the enforcer as an 
element of the doctrine'; 'Mens wil dus graag die uitlatings van die hof in die Sonap-saak so vertolk dat dit nie 
bedoel is om aan skuld in hierdie konteks hoegenaamd enige funksie te ontse nie, maar om te beklemtoon dat skuld 
hier geen selfstandige beginsel verteenwoordig nie', Vander Merwe and Van Huyssteen, 1993 TSAR 496. These 
learned professors ibi assert that the presence of fault may be relevant to determine the reasonableness or otherwise 
of the reliance. 
107 
at 241B - D. 
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and to enquire' .108 'Alles in ag genome, is die uitspraak in die Sonap-saak versoenbaar 
met die standpunt dat by gebrek aan werklike consensus, kontraktuele gebondenheid op 'n 
redelike vertroue van consensus kan berus'. 109 
According to Reinecke110 , in casu the court came to the conclusion that the iustus error 
approach is based on the reliance theory. I am respectfully of the view that the court could 
have reached the same equitable result by having directly applied the reliance protection 
theory without resorting to the iustus error approach. The real reason why the contract-
assertor in casu could not hold the contract-denier liable to the contract, was that the 
former did not create a reasonable reliance by the latter that the former intended to bind 
himself to the contractual terms as understood by the latter. In this regard the question of 
mistake was, with respect, not dealt with satisfactorily. What is, however, important, and 
that is that the court in this case adopted an objective approach to determine the intention 
of the parties as is clear from the. following: ' ... external manifestations, and not the 
workings, of the minds of the parties' 111 , but in the event of dissensus the court would 
resort to the reliance theory112• Reinecke113 declares that the Sonap decision 'moet 
108 Kerr, Good Faith in Negotiating A Contract. The Duty to enquire if there is a perceived or apparent mistake in 
Conununication, 1993 THRHR 296, at 298; Sonap, supra, at 242B; Kerr ibi points out that in casu there seems 
to have been no reliance on any representations by any of the parties. What happened in casu is that the parties 
were at cross purposes. The ratio decidendi in the Sonap case seems to accord very much with the following 
proposition of Kerr : 'If a party makes use of words (whether orally or in writing ... ) which do not express his 
intention and the other party knows that they do not express, or if a reasonable man in the other party's position 
would know this, then that other party is not entitled to snatch at advantage,'Kerr, Principles, supra, at 26, 
Hawthorne and Lotz, Contract Law Case Book for Students, 1994, indicate that the misrepresentation upon which 
the contract-denier relied occurred tacitly, at 40. 
109 Vander Merwe and Van Huyssteen, 1993 TSAR 497, 495. 
110 supra, at 374 and 375. Also see Floyd and Pretorius, supra, at 668 who contend that this was so held for the first 
time in SA. This view is also shared by Lubbe and Murray, supra, at 164. They propose : 'In the absence of 
agreement, it is the expectation or belief (reliance) of one of the parties which must form the basis of the contract'. 
Cf. De Vos, Mistake in Contract, in Essays in Honour of Ben Beinart 181; Kritzinger 1983 SAU 47; Van 
Rensburg 1986 THRHR 448 at 453; Hutchinson and Van Heerden 1987 SAU 523. 
111 at 238J. 
112 supra, at 239A. Hawthorne and Lotz, supra, indicate that the merit of this decision lies in the fact that it expressly 
rejected : (a) estoppel as a possible solution for the mistake problem; (b) the necessity for requiring fault in 
determining whether or not fault (blameworthiness), whether dolus or culpa, is an element of reliance protection, 
at 40. 
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vanwee verskillende oorweginge as 'n belangrike mylpaal in die ontwikkeling van die 
onderhawige regsgebied gesien word'. 
According to Floyd and Pretorius the court 'glossed over the contradictory approaches in 
the positive law by not discussing them but merely accepting that they are all interpretations 
and applications of the Blackburn J - dictum'~ 114 I agree with this finding and 
commentary wholeheartedly! These writers, in the school of De Wet, question whether fault 
should be rejected entirely. They contend that the 'reason for holding a party to an entirely 
incorrectly expressed intention can only be found in blameworthiness, whether it be dolus 
or culpa. They contend that there must be some form of reproachable conduct such as fault 
or the creation of risk to found liability. 115 Meijers116 holds a similar view. These 
writers assert that the degree of each party's blameworthiness should be weighed up against 
the other's. 117 
Although there is much to be said for the view expressed by the writers, I prefer the 
viewpoint that blameworthiness should not be an element of reliance protection. Fevrier 
Breed also welcomes the Sonap decision as it regarded the application of the fault principle 
unnecessary in the case of mistake. She asserts that the fault principle was entirely absent 
in Roman and Roman-Dutch Law -accordingly fault should not be the decisive factor in 
113 supra, at 375. 
114 
supra, at 670. 
115 supra, at 671. Also see De Wet, Estoppel, supra, at 73; VanDer Merwe, Duiwel, supra, at 19; Malan, supra, 
at 230 -231 and the cases there cited; Cf. Kritzinger, supra, at 270; Christie, Contracts, at 204, 387. 
116 De grondslag der aansprakelijheid bij contraktueele vernlichtingen in Verzamelde privaatrechtelijke opstellen, deel 
III, 1955ed, 84 - 85. 
117 Corbin asserts where there are two innocent parties it is unconvincing to hold one party liable to bear the entire 
loss, but the reason for holding one party liable is to be found in actual business practices and mores or in business 
convenience. Also see Joubert (ed), LAWSA, Vol 5, supra, at par. 112. Fried assets that in many cases 'both 
parties are harmed, neither is at fault, neither benefits'. He argues that in these cases a remedy possibly lies in the 
creation of a Fund by the state to which everybody contributes, as the MV A Fund for example, and i.r.o. which 
every aggrieved may institute a claim for loss suffered by the eventuation of a risk, as in the case of a garbled 
transmission of intention. 
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determining the effect of an alleged mistake in contract. 118 She contends that the test 
applied in practice to the communication of the declaration of the will is the reasonableness 
test, and not the accepted well-known reasonable man test for negligence. With this I agree. 
Hence the possibility raised by Floyd and Pretorius that 'the test for reasonableness of the 
reliance should therefore be seen as a test for negligence' 119 is rejected out of hand. 
The requirement of fault would place contractual liability on par with delictual liability, so 
that the distinction between these two branches of the law would become blurred. 
Furthermore, current commercial needs and interests militate against it. In a dispensation 
of contractual freedom, it would cut against the grain of commercial equity to limit 
contractual freedom by the application of the fault requirement to found contractual liability 
in the absence of actual consensus. I do not require proof of the additional element of 
culpa in whichever form, for to require this would place-a burden too onerous upon the 
contract-assertor or denier which would be tantamount to gross unfairness and inequity. 
Such an additional requirement of fault, in the instant circumstances, would be at variance 
with the practice and interests of commerce. 'The overriding consideration seems to be 
whether the reliance is reasonable when all the circumstances are taken into account, and 
not so much whether particular, separate requirements pertaining to the. parties' conduct 
have been met' 120• That is really the crux of the matter. There is no need to give the word 
'material' when used in the context of a 'material mistake' any other meaning than the one 
just adumbrated. It is true that reliance alone is insufficient to found liability : hence the 
requirement of reasonable or material reliance. It is trite that in our law the element of 
'materiality' is correlative with that of 'reasonableness' and it behoves no further debate or 
even authority. 
In Steyn v LSA Motors (Pty) Ltd121 Botha JA held that to disregard the subjective 
intention of a contractant and postulating 'the outward manifestation of the intention as the 
sole and conclusive touchstone of the respondent's contractual liability' as 'fundamentally 
118 supra, at 218. 
119 supra, at 672. 
120 Vander Merwe, Van Huyssteen, et alii, supra, at 31. 
121 1994 (1) SA 49 (A). 
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fallacious' 122• The court said that this was contrary to legal principle. The court indicated 
that in the absence of consensus the 'outward appearance of agreement flowing from the 
of(eree's acceptance of the offer as it stands does not in itself or necessarily result in 
contractual liability. Nor is it in itself decisive that the offeree accepted the offer in reliance 
upon the offeror's implicit representation that the offer correctly reflected his 
intention'. 123 According to the court the decisive question to be asked in the 
circumstances is whether 'a reasonable man in the position of the appellant' would have 
held the belief held by the contractant. 
Reinecke124indicates that the point of departure in the instant case was that the will or 
intention of the parties in principle forms the basis for contractual liability, and that in the 
case of dissensus not the declaration theory, but rather the reliance protection theory could 
supplement the consensual theory. 
In Maresky v MorkeP25 Farlam AJ held that as the respondent had committed a iustus 
error in corpore, the purported agreement was void. The court correctly expressed that 
it could not 'agree that the parol evidence rules apply in this case' .126 
In Dlovo v Brian Porter Motors Ltd t/a Port Motors Newlands127 the court held that if 
a contract-denier is able to show that he had been induced to sign a contract whilst 
labouring under a misapprehension concerning its nature, purport or contents of a 
document, then the caveat subscriptor rule cannot avail the contract-assertor, since the 
contract-denier would have acted under a iustus error. This is also the position in 
122 
at 61B -D. 
123 
at 61C - D. 
124 1994 TSAR 372 at 374. 
125 1994 (1) SA 249 (C) at 256F-G; 258F. Also see D.18.1.9pr. 
126 
at 256E/F. 
127 1994 (2) SA 518 at 524H -I. 
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American Law. 128 I submit that the contract-denier would only succeed in his defence if 
his mistake was reasonable, which would have been the .case if one of the requirements for 
the direct application of reliance protection was absent. 
In Wilson Bayly Holmes (Pty) Ltd v Maeyane and Others129, Nugent J held that 
contractual liability is based on what the parties actually intended, whether expressly or 
tacitly. In casu, since A had voluntarily assumed that a state of affairs existed, it could 
not claim that its error was iustus. 
It is clear, and I forcefully submit that gleaning from the last three cases cited, our courts 
(other than at the Appellate Division) are at this stage of their development not prepared 
to directly apply reliance protection in cases relating to mistake in contract : In each case 
the court was only prepared to do so in a roundabout way by applying the iustus error 
doctrine. In most cases where a contract-denier laboured under a reasonable mistake, the 
court will invariably hold that the contract-assertor could not simultaneously have held a 
reasonable belief that the former's imputed or apparent intention accorded with the latter's 
actual intention. That being so, the contract-assertor's reliance upon the contact-denier's 
apparent consensus will not be protected, since in the light of the surrounding 
circumstances, the belief held would have been an unreasonable one. 
Finally it is submitted that there exists no causa in law which prevenrs the courts from 
doing so based on the facta probanda and the onus probandi indicated in this treatise. For 
reasons of equity our courts should develop towards a presumption of reasonable reliance 
in favour of the contract-assertor who can prove that by some conduct of the contract-denier 
the former laboured under an alleged reasonable reliance of consensus. The onus would 
then be on the contract-denier to rebut any prima facie proof which thecontract-assertor 
may have established for the operation of the presumption130• 
128 Restatement of Contract, 2ed, 211. Also see Calamari and Perillo, Contracts, 2ed (1977) at 336-347. 
For English Law, cf. Halsbury's Laws of England, vol 9, sv Contract, par. 295 at 171. 
129 1995 (4) SA 340 (T) at 345. 
130 See Vander Merwe, Van Huyssteen et alii, supra, at 31. 
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RISK LIABILITY 
This treatise would be incomplete if I do not very briefly give my view appertaining risk 
liability in cases relating to mistake in contract. In Saambou Nasionale Bouvereniging 
Jansen JA131 questioned whether the risk principle applied in the South African Law. The 
court left the teasing question unsolved as to which principle or theory should serve as the 
basis of contractual liability in the situation where one party elects a particular mode of 
communication to convey his intention, but in the transmission of his intention to the other 
contractant the former's intention is incorrectly conveyed to the latter, as in the case of the 
garbled telegram. 
Meijers132 indicates that if a person creates a dangerous situation (''gevaarsetting') then 
the person has to bear the risk thereof.· The professor questions whether the contractant 
should bear the full liability for having created the risk particularly if the contractant's 
conduct was unaccompanied by fault : he thus has his doubts. He asserts that the protection 
of 'goede trouw' must be weighed up against the conduct without fault, whether fraudulent 
or negligent. According to Kahn133 the risk view of Meijers is consistent with the reliance 
theory of contract, and seems 'commendable in this form' subject to the necessary rider that 
no man may take any advantage of an obvious error. As it appears to me, the concept or 
principle which underlies Hartkamp's134 sentiments is liability, in the present 
circumstances, based on 'toerekenbare schijn' which is but, in my view, another form or 
appearance of reliance protection. 
The view of Kahn may be neatly summed up as follows : he who 'initiates the use of so 
fallible a means of communication as a telegram must take the risk of an error in 
transmission, subject to the reservation that any party sending a particular telegram must 
take all the reasonable steps to ensure that it is correctly committed and the overriding rule 
131 at 997 - 998. 
132 E.M. Meijers, Verzamelde Privaatrechtelijke Opstallen, Derde Deel, Verbintenissenrecht, Leiden, at 97- 98. 
133 Kahn, Lewis and Visser, Ellison Kahn Contract & Mercantile Law., Vol. 1, 2ed, at 146. 
134 supra, at par. 119. 
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prohibiting the snatching' of a bargain is not violated. 135 A sombre view of the situation 
is adopted by McLennan136 who opines that it would 'surely be an injustice to penalize 
one party for the mistake which could, after all, have happened just as easily to the other'. 
He then correctly adds that 'just as the sender of a telegram must be taken to know the 
dangers of garbling, so the recipient must be taken to know that the telegram may not have 
been accurately transmitted'. 
For Christie the question is simply 'whether the doctrine of quasi-mutual assents finds a 
place here' 137• According to Christie a contract will come into being if the one party 
initiating the mode of communication has so conducted himself as to induce or cause the 
other party reasonably to believe that there is a contract on the terms understood by the 
other party. One way of tackling the problem according to De Wet is to hold that in this 
exceptional case a contractant may be held liable for the reasonable belief or impression 
which has conduct has created in the mind of the other, i.e. a reliance based liability or 
liability based on reliance protection138• On this approach De Wet argues that the belief 
created should have been caused by blameworthy conduct. Floyd and Pretorius139 as well 
as Malan140 seem to support this approach. Thus based on their contentions, in the 
absence of fault, the contract-denier will not be bound to the contract; if both parties are 
at fault, no contractual liability arises; or if fault lies on the contract-assertor and not on the 
contract-denier, then no contract comes into being in terms of the reliance theory. There 
is much to be said for this viewpoint. 
Sonap's case did not deal with the issue to hand. This notwithstanding, Floyd and Pretorius 
contend that the risk principle should be applied in order to effect an equitable and fair 
135 Mistake in a Telegram, 1971 SAU 417, at 419. Also see E. Kahn, Some Mysteries of Offer and Acceptance', 
1955 SAU 246, at 266. 
136 1971 Annual Survey of South African Law 82. 
137 supra, at 88. 
138 De Wet and VanWyk, 5ed, supra, at 15 - 16; De Wet, Estoppel, supra, at 73. 
139 supra, at 672- 673. 
140 Malan, supra, at 230 - 231. 
- 28-
result in the instant situation as well as in other instances where the iustus error approach 
cannot be applied. In my view, the creation of risk in the present context relates to the 
element of representation or conduct. A possible solution which I wish to postulate is that 
when a contract-denier has created the risk by initiating negotiations by utilising a particular 
form of communication such as a telegram (i.e. made a representation by using a telegram), 
and caused the contract-assertor to reasonably believe that a certain state of affairs existed 
which in fact did not exist, and the latter acted upon that reasonable belief to his detriment 
or prejudice, then the contract-denier should be held contractually liable. 
I with respect disagree with the viewpoint that it is only when 'die redelike vertroue van 
die een deur verwytbare gedrag teweeggebring is, kan daar rede bestaan om die redelike 
vertroue te handhaaf. 141 Blameworthy conduct is a major factor to consider when 
determining contractual liability based on reliance protection, but I am of the view that it 
is not the only element which can prove the reasonableness of the reliance. It should not 
be elevated to an independent element as I argue below. In the present context, I do not 
require the additional element of culpa in whichever form, for to require this would place 
too onerous a burden on the contract-assertor which would be tantamount to gross 
unfairness and inequity, and would also cut against the grain of commercial practice and 
• 
convenience. It should also be stressed that it is not any belief that results in liability, but 
a reasonable one. This means that regard must objectively be had to all the surrounding 
circumstances of the given situation. In the instant situation the direct application of the 
reliance theory (reliance protection), with the application of the requirements as I have just 
enunciated, would in my view be the best solution to the issue raised under this head. 
CONCLUSION 
It is my submission that based on reliance protection, 'a contract can come into existence 
either if there is actual consensus between the parties to an agreement or if the will of one 
party coincides with the reasonable reliance created in his mind by the other party about 
the latter's will' 142• In either case the reasonable reliance of one contractant on the 
141 De Wet and VanWyk, 4ed, at 14. 
142 Idem. 
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actual or imputed consensus of the other is protected. 143 This may either be achieved 
psychologically in terms of the will theory or normatively, in accordance with the 
traditional reliance theory. Whenever the former approach leads to inequitable results, then 
the consensual theory must be tempered or corrected by the reliance theory (i.e. has to be 
applied) to achieve fair and equitable results. This approach undoubtedly serves the needs 
of the garbled telegram, the caveat subscriptor rule circumstances, mistake, parol evidence 
etc. Previous dealings, negotiations etc. between the contractual parties should play a major 
role in determining whether or not reliance upon consensus should be protected. 144 For 
example, to allow a party, knowing that the other party is labouring under a 
misapprehension, to snatch a bargain cannot be permitted under any circumstances145 -
such conduct would be mala fide. Surely it cannot be contested that a contractant has a 
duty to speak or act if it is deemed reasonable in the circumstances that the contractant 
should speak or act so as to prevent the other contractant from acting to his detriment. 146 
Hofmann, an exponent of the subjective approach to contract and the will theory, rejects 
the reliance protection theory as a starting point of contractual liabilitY for he argues that 
it takes the abnormal case as the starting point of a general theory147 since people in the 
main do not commit errors in concluding contracts. However, this rejection loses sight of 
143 In the Netherlands as well as in America the view has been held that not the will theory but the 
'reasonable expectation raised by the other party' should be considered as the basis of the contract. In 
my view, this theory is but another version or label for reliance protection. Harker also indicates at 125 
that the importance of actual consensus as the basis of contactualliability has declined, and that there has 
been a resurgence of 'benefit-based and reliance-based liability in contractual affairs'. 
144 See Restatement of the Law of Contract, par. 72 (1) (c). 
145 as was also held by Harms AJA in Sonap, supra, at 241D, 242B - C; Kahn, supra, at 266; 1971 SAIJ 
419. 
' \ 
146 See Joubert (ed), LAWSA, Vol9, per The Honourable Former Chief Justice P.J. RABIE, at par. 371 
note 3. 
147 supra, at 436. According to DeVos, both the declaration and the reliance protection theories are 'based 
on consensus as the bedrock of liability'. He argues that when applying the consensual theory in strictu 
senso, the general rule is that in the absence of consensus, there is no contract. However, in exceptional 
circumstances, the demands of commercial certainty demand our courts to depart from it and in fact 
abandon the consensual theory and to apply the reliance protection theory as a corrective to the consensual 
theory where the latter leads to an unsatisfactory result. In my opinion I see no need for the latter theory 
to be a corrective to the former : the former theory is a subset or one aspect of reliance protection. 
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the fact that the reliance protection theory can also embrace the consensual theory as 
indicated above. 
'Die vertrouensteorie word in die genoemde rol(le) algemeen as billik beskou. Dit lewer 
na my wete geen besondere probleme vir die handelsverkeer op nie en kan ook sonder 
oormatige akrobatiek by ons regsistematiek ingepas word. ' 148 A legal principle or theory 
should give rise to a result which is fair and equitable. The time of the fulfilment of the 
following prediction of Vander Merwe and Van Huyssteen has arrived: 'Eventually the 
substantive rules may actually change due to the continued application of estoppel : a 
reliance on the existence of consensus may become the basis of an actual contract'. 149 
This is of course nothing other than reliance protection which I hav~ postulated in this 
paper. 
Reliance protection has been termed as the doctrine of 'quasi-mutual consent or assent' 150 
or as estoppeP51 • Kahn is undoubtedly correct in asserting that the theory of 'quasi-
mutual assent' has at times been thought to be estoppel by representation. 152 As at 1976 
when De Vos wrote this article he claims that the court did not use the term reliance 
protection theory, instead it used the term estoppel, as enunciated in Smith v Hughes153 • 
In the most recent decision that I encountered, Constantia Graswerke Bk v Snyman154 
Heher J held obiter that the reliance upon quasi-mutual assent may give rise to the 
conclusion that legal consensus existed between the parties. However, in casu, the court 
148 Van Rensburg, supra, at 458. 
149 A Perspective on the Elements of Estoppel by Representation, 1988 TSAR 568, at 571. Also see Saambou 
Nasionale v Friedman at 993 - 996. 
150 Christie, R. H., The Law of Contract in South Africa, 2ed, 1991, 2, 23 et sequuntur; Kerr, The 
Principles, supra, at 10. 
151 Atiyah, supra, is undoubtedly correct in asserting that estoppel is an illustration of what can only be 
'rationally regarded as reliance-based liability'. 
152 supra, at 442 note 10 and the authorities cited there. 
153 (1870-1) LR 6 QB 597 at 607, per Blackburn J. 
154 1996 (4) SA 117 (W), at 1241- 125C. 
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found that the Defendant had not created a reasonable reliance of consensus in the mind 
of the Plaintiff to be bound by the apparent contract, and hence the reliance held by the 
Plaintiff could not be protected. This is, with respect, a classical case in which the court 
could have applied the principles expounded in this treatise as a basis to ascertain whether 
a contractual relationship came into being or existed between the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant. 
I agree wholeheartedly with Jansen JA who opined in Saambou that the doctrine of estoppel 
'skyn in 'n mate die van die vertrouensteorie by kontraksluiting te oorvleuel. ' 155 Thus 
in the arena of the reliance theory the label of estoppel is often used. Hence the court 
indicated in Saambou that it would be preferable not to speak of true estoppel in this 
instance 'as ware estoppel nie bedoel word nie' .156 In Sonap the court went so far as to 
reject the estoppel approach as a possible solution to contractual liability, as it merely 
confuses the topic. 157 Be that as it may, that does not mean that we should altogether 
ignore past decisions and treatises dealing with estoppel in relation to contractual liability. 
I would rather assert that the term "estoppel" not be used in the present setting, but that 
those of its aspects which accord with reliance protection should fruitfully be used in future 
so as to develop this branch of our law as we are seeking to develop a uniform and 
acceptable basis for contractual liability. So even as regards estoppel in a contractual 
context, it is submitted that fault should be discarded as an element to bring it in line with 
the requisites of the reliance protection. 
To conclude my discussion, I respectfully submit that our law has reached that stage of its 
development that the concepts mentioned. in the foregoing paragraphs should be merged. 
Reliance protection is in my opinion the most scientific and practical basis for such a 
confusio. In my submission the elements of the direct application of reliance protection 
should apply equally to the instances mentioned above to found contractual liability. 
Obviously, contractual liability based upon reliance protection can be avoided when a 
contract-denier succeeds in proving that a contract-assertor has failed to establish all the 
155 at 1002C -E. 
156 
at 1004H; at 1006C - D. 
157 
at 240D. 
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prerequisites for contractual liability. 
Finally, on a conspectus of the foregoing, it is my submission that the direct application of 
reliance protection as enunciated above can effectively serve as the basis of contractual 
liability. 
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